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Emerging Economies After the Global
Financial Crisis: the Case of Brazil
By Enrique R. Carrasco* & Sean Williams**
Abstract: Emerging economies have rebounded relatively quickly from the 2008
global financial crisis, and despite various challenges they face resulting from
the European sovereign debt crisis, they face bright economic futures. While
many observers have focused on China and India, Brazil is an emerging
economy that has enjoyed increasing visibility. This Article examines Brazil’s
evolution into an emerging economy, or given the market-based nature of the
term, an emerging market economy (EME). The economic, social, political, and
legal reforms that have contributed to Brazil’s status as an EME have bolstered
the power and legitimacy of its voice in international affairs, giving the country
an important role in articulating a new global order as envisioned by former
president Lula da Silva. However, its voice will resonate only to the extent it
continues to address a number of challenges ranging from economic policy to
corruption.
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“The issues at the core of our concerns – the financial crisis, new global
governance and climate change – have a strong common denominator. It is the
need to build a new international order that is sustainable, multilateral and less
asymmetric, free of hegemonies and ruled by democratic institutions. This new
world is a political and moral imperative. We cannot just shovel away the rubble
of failure; we must be midwives to the future! This is the only way to make
repairs for so much injustice and to prevent new collective tragedies.”
President H. E. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva

I. INTRODUCTION
Emerging economies rock, so they say. While the United States
struggles to recover from the 2008 global financial crisis and European
countries have been mired in a sovereign debt crisis, emerging economies
rebounded relatively quickly from the 2008 global financial crisis, and
despite various challenges they face resulting from the European crisis, they
face bright economic futures.
While many observers have focused on China and India, Brazil is an
emerging economy that has enjoyed increasing visibility. Since 2003, it has
pursued an orthodox macroeconomic framework that brought inflation
under control, produced primary budget surpluses, decreased foreign debt,
and increased foreign reserves. The resultant economic growth reached a
peak in 2010, when it registered a 7.5% annual growth rate in gross
domestic product,1 which far exceeded the average annual global growth

1

Jeff Fick, Update: Brazil’s Economic Growth Slows to a Crawl in 3Q, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 6, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20111206-704224.html.
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rate of 4.3% for that year.2 Despite the knock-on effects of the European
sovereign debt crisis and the government’s concerted effort to slow
economic growth to curb inflation,3 analysts predict an annual growth rate
for Brazil of 3.3% in 2012.4 In 2011, Brazil overtook the U.K. as the sixthlargest economy in the world.5
This Article examines Brazil’s evolution into an emerging economy,
or given the market-based nature of the term, an emerging market economy
(EME)—we will use the terms interchangeably. We begin in Part II by
outlining the broadly accepted definition of an EME. The term generally
refers to dynamic economies that have attracted considerable investor
interest, and are gaining economic and political clout on the global stage.
EME’s are nevertheless “emerging” to the extent that their economies
continue to be impeded by a number of factors ranging from policy failures
to inequality.
Part III examines Brazil’s path towards becoming an EME—the “preemergent” Brazil. We cover four periods in this pre-emergent era. The first
is the post-independence economic stagnation in the nineteenth century.
The second is the period of high economic growth that commenced in the
early twentieth century. This period, which came to an end with the debt
crisis of the early 1980s, included the adoption of import substitution
policies and the onset of the “Brazilian Miracle” from 1968 to 1973. The
third period addresses Brazil’s debt crisis of the 1980s and its experience
during the “lost decade.” During this period, President Sarney introduced
the ultimately unsuccessful “Cruzado Plan,” which introduced a new
currency (the cruzado) and froze prices and exchange rates after deindexing the economy. The fourth period included significant economic
reforms under Fernando Collor de Mello and the implementation of the
“Real Plan” designed by Finance Minister and future President Fernando
Henrique Cardoso, which, among other things, introduced a new currency
(the real), tightened monetary policy, introduced a managed-float exchange
rate system, cut spending, and increased taxes.
Part IV explains why, thanks to the reforms of Presidents Cardoso and
2
GDP
Growth
(Annual
%),
WORLD
BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/BRXJ?display=graph (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
3
Press Release, Council For The Americas, 8th Annual Latin American Predictors
Forum: Economic, Financial and Trade Predictions for 2012 (Dec. 2, 2011).
4
Raymond Colitt, Brazil’s GDP Growth of 2.7% Last Year Underperformed BRIC
Peers: Economy, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0306/brazil-s-gdp-growth-of-2-7-last-year-underperformed-bric-peers-economy.html.
5
Sara Miller Llana, Brazil Bumps Britain to Become World’s Sixth Largest Economy,
CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE
MONITOR
(Dec.
27,
2011),
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2011/1227/Brazilbumps-Britain-to-become-world-s-sixth-largest-economy.
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Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, Brazil is now considered an EME. Lula
followed Cardoso’s orthodox economic policy that reduced interest rates
and fostered greater ties with other developing countries to help decrease
Brazil’s dependence on the Global North for its exports. Brazil has also
benefited from policies favoring improved infrastructure, international
trade, increased foreign direct investment, and improved government
institutions. Importantly, Lula increased Brazil’s influence internationally,
as evidenced by reforms at the International Monetary Fund and G-20.
Part V addresses Brazil’s remaining challenges, including excessive
spending, continued over-dependence on commodity exports, corruption,
problematic regulatory and legal frameworks, an inefficient judiciary, and
inequality.
Part VI concludes this Article. The post-crisis global state of affairs
has provided emerging economies, especially the so-called “BRICS”—
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—with a platform to
articulate the framework for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). 6
The question is whether Brazil should help resurrect the NIEO of the 1970s.
We conclude that it should not. Instead, Brazil should rely on its rich
history to promote an ethically-based NIEO.

6
See Towards a New International Economic Order, U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 2nd
comm. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.2/64/L.16 (Nov. 2, 2009); see also RUMU SARKAR,
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW: RULE OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL FINANCE 9
(2009) (“[T]rade relations and capital investments are being ‘rationalized’ in a new
international economic order that does not conform to the outlines of the postcolonialist
relations of the past.”); Ruth Gordon, The Dawn of a New, New International Economic
Order?, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (2009); Tiffany Limsico, Global Governance on the
Making: Prospects for a New World Order in Tackling Economic Injustice, 16 TRANSITION
STUD. REV. 520 (2009); Beatriz Bissio, Emerging Powers Cooking up New International
Order,
GLOBAL
GEOPOLITICS
&
POL.
ECON.
(Apr.
16,
2010),
http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2010/04/16/emerging-powers-cooking-up-newinternational-order/; Carlos Garramòn, Pittsburg: “The World is Heading Toward a New
International Economic Order”, OPINIONSUR (Oct. 2009), http://opinionsur.org.ar/PittsburgThe-World-is-Heading; Andrew E. Kramer, Four Nations Seek More Diversity in Global
Economic Order, N. Y. TIMES, June 19, 2009, at 10, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C00EED91131F934A25755C0A96F9C8B
63; Kevin Muehring, New World Order the Balance of Power at the IMF Is Shifting to
Developing Countries, 43 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 7 (2009); Phil Ruthven, A New World
Order, 31 BUS. REV. WKLY. 19 (2009); Robert J. Samuelson, A New Economic Order,
NEWSWEEK,
May
10,
2010,
at
24,
available
at
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/04/30/a-new-economic-order.html; Mansoor
Dailami & Paul R. Masson, The New Multi-Polar International Monetary System (World
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5147, 2009); Jagadeesh Gokhale, Toward a New
Economic
Order,
CATO
INST.
(Aug.
10,
2010),
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12074.
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II. WHAT IS AN “EMERGING MARKET ECONOMY”?
Antoine van Agtmael of the World Bank’s International Finance
Corporation (IFC) coined the term “emerging market” in 1981.7 At the
time, he was attempting to start a “Third World Equity Fund,” but he had to
come up with a more dynamic name to attract investors.8 Emerging
markets were characterized by growing economies and increased wealth
with low-to-middle per capita income.9 The basic notion was that emerging
economies, such as the East Asian Tigers of the 1980s (South Korea,
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan), were “emerging” because they were
becoming significant players in the modern global economy.10
The IFC’s origination of the term indicates that it was investor driven.
Thus, in 1992 the IFC’s Farida Khambata coined the term “frontier
markets” for economies that had not reached the status of emerging markets
(because of, say, small market capitalization11), but nevertheless presented
promising investment opportunities.12 Moreover, in 2001, Goldman Sachs
singled out Brazil, Russia, India, and China—the “BRICs”—as countries
that, because of their increased global clout, should be considered for
inclusion in the G-7.13 Today, the keen interest in investing in emerging
7

Ins and Outs: Acronyms BRIC Out All Over, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 2008, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/12080703?story_id=12080703.
8
Id. (“Racking my brain, at last I came up with a term that sounded more positive and
invigorating: emerging markets. ‘Third World’ suggested stagnation; ‘emerging markets’
suggested progress, uplift, and dynamism.”).
9
Christopher B. Barry et al., Performance Characteristics of Emerging Capital Markets,
54 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 72, 72 (1998).
10
The literature regarding the East Asian Tigers is vast. See, e.g., ASIAN DEVELOPMENT
BANK, EMERGING ASIA: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES (1997); COLM FOY ET AL., THE FUTURE
OF ASIA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1998); INDERMIT GILL & HOMI KHARAS, AN EAST ASIAN
RENAISSANCE:
IDEAS
FOR
ECONOMIC
GROWTH
(2007),
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEASTASIAPACIFIC/Resources/2262621158536715202/EA_Renaissance_full.pdf; RAMKISHEN S. RAJAN, EMERGING ASIA: ESSAYS
ON CRISES, CAPITAL FLOWS, FDI, AND EXCHANGE RATES (2011); Paul Krugman, The Myth of
Asia’s Miracle, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 62 (1994); Steven Radelet & Jeffrey Sachs, Asia’s
Reemergence, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 43 (1997); Pietro Cova et al., Global Imbalances: The Role
of Emerging Asia (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 09/64, 2009).
11
Wei Li & Richard Hoyer-Ellefsen, Characteristics of Emerging Markets 3 (Investing
in Emerging Markets Technical Note Series, Working Paper No. 1, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=909890 (“In fact, market depth is the main distinction between
emerging and frontier market countries.”).
12
Ben R. Marshall et al., Frontier Market Diversification and Transaction Costs
(October 11, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1942592.
Frontier markets include Argentina, Kuwait, Romania, Sri Lanka, Qatar, Ukraine, and
Vietnam. Id. at 7.
13
Jim O’Neill, Global Economic Paper No.66: Building Better Global Economic BRICs,
GOLDMAN SACHS ECON. RES., Nov. 30, 2001, at 3. The G-7 is a forum for international
economic discussions. Its members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. The G-7 is now often referred to as the G-8, with Russia
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markets is embodied in Morgan Stanley Capital Market International’s
emerging market indices, such as the MSCI Emerging Market Index, which
are followed by nearly ninety percent of emerging market managers.14
Currently, the MSCI Emerging Market Index consists of twenty-one
emerging country indices: Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic,
Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and
Turkey.15
Although “emerging economy” lacks a precise definition, common
themes have emerged since the term’s inception. Emerging market
economies, as illustrated by those listed above, are characterized by
significant and rapid economic growth evidenced by rising gross domestic
product (GDP) in an aggregate and per capita basis, increased trade
volumes, as well as increased foreign reserves.16
Emerging economies are also hosts to increased foreign investment.17
Foreign investment fuels rapid economic growth, as investors seek out
higher profit margins.18 Countries can attract investors by pursuing marketbeing the eighth member.
What is the G8?, G8 INFORMATION CENTRE,
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/what_is_g8.html (last updated Feb. 6, 2012).
14
The Long View: How Adventurous are Emerging Markets?, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2006,
6:48
PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/be77e600-605f-11db-a7160000779e2340.html#axzz1fsi1MoZP.
15
Index
Definitions,
MCSI
(May
30,
2011)
http://www.msci.com/products/indices/tools/index.html#EM.
16
M. AYHAN KOSE & ESWAR S. PRASAD, EMERGING MARKETS: RESILIENCE AND GROWTH
AMID GLOBAL TURMOIL 2 (2010); see also Richard Harmsen & Nagwa Riad, Trading Places,
48 FIN. & DEV. 44, 45 (2011) (observing a marked increase in both trade volumes and
interconnectedness in emerging markets); Robert E. Hoskisson et al., Strategy in Emerging
Economies, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 249, 249 (2000) (noting that EMEs are characterized by
rapid economic development); Dani Rodrik, The Social Cost of Foreign Exchange Reserves,
20 INT’L ECON. J. 3, 4 (2006) (noting that the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves is a
response to the series of financial crises that struck emerging markets in the 1990s, after
which some observers suggested larger foreign exchange reserves would have allowed the
suffering countries to prevent contagion more effectively); Luis Orgaz et al., The Growing
Weight of the Emerging Economies in the World Economy and Governance: The Case of the
BRICs 2 (Banco de Espana, Occasional Paper No. 1101, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1797583.
17
LINCOLN GORDON, BRAZIL’S SECOND CHANCE: EN ROUTE TOWARD THE FIRST WORLD
15–16 (2001); see also Orgaz et al., supra note 16, at 24–25.
18
KOSE & PRASAD, supra note 16, at 53; see also DALE R. WEIGEL ET AL., FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT 13–15 (1997). Foreign investment is helpful in several ways. Foreign
investors bring large sums of foreign exchange (which helps ease balance-of-payment
concerns in the host market), technology, administrative expertise, and training capacity—all
of which help make an economy more efficient. See WERNER BAER, THE BRAZILIAN
ECONOMY: GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 240–41 (5th ed. 2001). Increased FDI has also been
associated with export diversification, wage increases, and rising employment. Andrea
Amaro & William Miles, Racing to the Bottom for FDI?: The Changing Role of Labor Costs
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based reforms ranging from orthodox macroeconomic policies to being
open to international trade—hence, one encounters the interchangeable term
“emerging market economies” (EMEs).19
Orthodox macroeconomic
policies include, among other things, privatization of state-owned
businesses,20 liberalization of domestic banking systems and stock markets
to allow foreigners easier access,21 and decreased debt.22 As for trade,
EMEs are generally more open to international trade than other economies,
including advanced economies.23 While this openness is spurred initially
by export-led growth models, it functions to diversify the goods countries
export.24 Diversification and general integration into the international
economy help reduce the effects of sudden changes in global prices or other
internal or external economic shocks, making the country more stable for
investors.25
and Infrastructure, 40 J. DEVELOPING AREAS 1, 1 (2006), available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4193013.
19
KOSE & PRASAD, supra note 16, at 53; see also Wiegel, supra note 18, at 10;
Giuseppina Maria Chiara Talamo, FDI, Mode of Entry and Corporate Governance, in
GEOGRAPHY, STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND EMPIRICS
29, 60–61 (2009), available at http://growthbook4.ec.unipi.it/Chapter2.pdf.
20
KOSE & PRASAD, supra note 16, at 53; see also Mary M. Shirley, Privatization and
Performance, 17 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 669, 670 (1993) (“Privatization is viewed
as one way to break the direct link between the enterprise and the government and, in the
process, to improve performance, raise capital, and reduce the government’s exposure to
commercial risk.”).
21
KOSE & PRASAD, supra note 16, at 53; see also Geert Bekaert et al., Does Financial
Liberalization Spur Growth?, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 3 (2001) (arguing that equity market
liberalization leads to a one percent increase in real economic growth over a five-year period
on average); Harjoat Singh Bhamra, Stock Market Liberalization and the Cost of Capital in
Emerging Markets 1 (Mar. 19, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1365041.
22
KOSE & PRASAD, supra note 16, at 57; see also Martin Feldstein, A Self-Help Guide
for Emerging Markets, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 93, 102 (1999).
23
KOSE & PRASAD, supra note 16, at 57; see also Orgaz et al., supra note 16, at 22.
24
KOSE & PRASAD, supra note 16, at 41; see also Rudiger Dornbusch, The Case for
Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries, 6 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 71–72 (1992)
(explaining how the negative effects of protectionism on export industries often leads to
liberalization); Allen Dennis & Ben Shepherd, Trade Costs, Barriers to Entry, and Export
Diversification in Developing Countries 1 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper
No. 4368, 2007) (arguing that for every 1% reduction in trade costs, there is a subsequent
0.3–0.4% increase in export diversification).
25
KOSE & PRASAD, supra note 16, at 71; see also John E. Wagner & Steven C. Deller,
Measuring the Effects of Economic Diversity on Growth and Stability, 74 LAND ECON. 541,
542 (1998) (arguing that diversification is necessary for long-term economic stability,
though specialization is necessary to spur short-term growth); Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew
Warner, Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration, BROOKINGS PAPER ON
ECON.
ACTIVITY,
no.
1,
1995,
at
55–56,
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/1995_1_bpea_papers/1995a_b
pea_sachs_warner_aslund_fischer.pdf.

87

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

33:81 (2012)

Economic factors are not the sole criteria used to designate EMEs.
Significant economic growth can translate into increased political influence
on a regional and international scale.26 The level of international political
clout varies from country to country, but EMEs generally are gaining power
and influence internationally, especially compared to other developing
countries.27 They are leaders in their respective regions, and are frequently
responsible for representing the interests of that entire region in global
economic affairs.28
The term EME suggests that a country so labeled has made significant
strides towards joining the ranks of “developed countries.” However,
“emerging” also suggests that an EME’s development is somehow
hindered. The typical factors that highlight this characteristic relate to
policy failures, weak institutional structures, underdeveloped and poorly
regulated financial sectors, and inequality. Policy failures, including
ineffective monetary and exchange rate policies29 and public investment
regimes (e.g., poorly allocated investments in infrastructure,30 education,31
26
Jim O’Neill et al., Global Economic Paper No.134: How Solid are the BRICs?,
GOLDMAN SACHS ECON. RES., Dec. 1, 2005, at 3; see also Orgaz et al., supra note 16, at 32.
27
Quentin Peel, Risks Rise in Shift to a Multipolar World, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at
8.
28
See, e.g., Juan de Onis, Brazil’s New Capitalism, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 107, 109 (2000)
(discussing Brazil as a political and economic leader in Latin America).
29
Paul Krugman, Dutch Tulips and Emerging Economies, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 28, 30
(1995) (noting that unsustainable exchange rates are behind the speculative attacks, which
EMEs have been famous for facing in the last two decades); Charalambos Tsangarides,
Crisis and Recovery: Role of Exchange Rate Regime in Emerging Market Economies 3 (Int’l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 10/242, 2010) (showing that countries with floating
exchange rate regimes have recovered from the global financial crisis faster than countries
with crawling peg regimes); see also Federico Ravenna & Fabio M. Natalucci, Monetary
Policy Choices in Emerging Market Economies: The Case of High Productivity Growth, 40
J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 243 (2008); but see Harun Alp et al., An Assessment of
Malaysian Monetary Policy During the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 (Int’l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No.12/35, 2012) (arguing that Malaysian Central Bank effectively
maneuvered its monetary policy to combat the negative effects of the global financial crisis).
30
Klaus E. Meyer, Perspectives on Multinational Enterprises in Emerging Economies,
35 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 259, 260 (2004) (“[EMEs] typically have less sophisticated market
supporting institutions and fewer locational advantages based on created assets, such as
infrastructure and human capital.”) (citations omitted). Infrastructure is especially important
for countries seeking to attract FDI while improving the domestic standard of living by
raising wages. Amaro & Miles, supra note 18, at 3 (“[B]etter infrastructure can increase the
productivity of labor. Thus, even if wages rise, higher productivity based on solid,
dependable infrastructure can lead to lower unit labor costs, and allow for higher incomes
without causing a loss of investment.”). Mexico is an example of an EME with rising wages
that has been held back by poor infrastructure. Id.
31
Eric A. Hanushek & Ludger Wobmann, The Role of Education Quality in Economic
Growth 51–58 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4122, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=960379. The literature is split as to the extent to which education
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and health32), and weak institutional structures (regulatory,33 judicial,34 and
(or human capital) is necessary for economic growth. Daniel Cohen & Marcelo Soto,
Growth and Human Capital: Good Data, Good Results, 12 J. ECON. GROWTH 51, 51–52
(2007). The first wave of research on the topic, referred to as “New Growth Theory,” found
a strong positive correlation between educational attainment and economic growth. See,
e.g., Robert E. Lucas Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY
ECON. 3 (1988); Paul Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71
(1990). Several authors later challenged this view, saying that previous research had
overstated the value of education to economic growth, but not negating its value entirely.
See, e.g., Jess Benhabib & Mark M. Speigel, The Role of Human Capital in Economic
Development: Evidence from Aggregate Cross-Country Data, 34 J. MONETARY ECON. 143
(1994); Lant Pritchett, Where Has All the Education Gone?, 15 WORLD BANK ECON. REV.
367 (2001); Mark Bils & Peter J. Klenow, Does Schooling Cause Growth?, 90 AM. ECON.
REV. 1160 (2000). Cohen and Soto argue that the differences between the authors arise due
to differences in the measurement and definition of “human capital”—a phrase which easily
eludes precise definition. Cohen & Soto, supra note 31, at 52. Hanushek and Wobmann
argue that studies showing only a small connection between education and economic growth
focus on years of education instead of cognitive abilities of the workforce. Hanushek
&Wobmann, supra note 31, at 1–4. They note that there is a very strong correlation between
cognitive ability of the workforce and economic growth. Id.
32
Halima A. Qureshi & Hasina A. Mohyuddin, Health Status, Diseases, and Economic
Development: A Cross-Country Analysis, 39 J. DEVELOPING AREAS 121, 122 (2006)
(observing that developing countries account for ninety percent of the global disease
burden); see also WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993: INVESTING IN HEALTH
17 (1993) (“Improved health contributes to economic growth in four ways: it reduces
production losses caused by worker illness; it permits the use of natural resources that had
been totally or nearly inaccessible because of disease; it increases the enrollment of children
in school and makes them better able to learn; and it frees for alternative uses resources that
would otherwise have to be spent on treating illness.”); David Wheeler, Basic Needs
Fulfillment and Economic Growth: A Simultaneous Model, 7 J. DEV. ECON. 435 (1980)
(showing that improved health conditions increase labor productivity and GDP growth).
33
Eswar S. Prasad, Financial Sector Regulation and Reform in Emerging Markets: An
Overview, in FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION AND REFORMS IN EMERGING MARKETS 3, 11
(Masahiro Kawai & Edward S. Prasad eds., 2011) (“A basic priority in emerging markets is
to strengthen the institutional framework in order to promote financial stability.”).
Regulations of intellectual property rights, taxation, capital markets, and competition are
often cited as examples of potential growth inhibitors for developing countries. See, e.g.,
David M. Gould & William C. Gruben, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in
Economic Growth, 48 J. DEV. ECON. 323 (1996) (showing a correlation between strong
intellectual property protection and economic growth, especially in open market economies);
Alireza Naghavi, Strategic Intellectual Property Rights Policy and North-South Technology
Transfer, 143 REV. WORLD ECON. 55 (2007) (arguing that strong protection of intellectual
property rights is in developing countries’ best interests because such protection encourages
FDI and technology transfer); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Capital Market Liberalization, Economic
Growth, and Instability, 28 WORLD DEV. 1075 (2000) (arguing, in the aftermath of the Asian
Financial Crisis, that total capital market liberalization has a destabilizing effect on
countries, but that capital market liberalization, with proper controls on short-term capital
flows, will spur economic growth without the destabilizing side effects of total
liberalization); Jean-Jacques Laffont, Competition, Information, and Development, in
ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1998, at 237–57 (Boris
Pleskovic & Joseph Stiglitz eds., 1998); Vito Tanzi & Howell H. Zee, Tax Policy for
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political35) raise transaction costs for foreign and domestic investors, which
makes doing business in that country more difficult and scares away
potential investors.36 The presence of underdeveloped financial sectors and
high inequality hinders the effective allocation of capital, which impedes
overall economic efficiency.37 Thus, defining an economy as “emerging”
Emerging Markets: Developing Countries (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 00/35,
2000) (discussing the myriad flaws in the taxation systems that affect economic growth in
developing countries); but see Ajit Singh, Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging
Markets: International and Developmental Dimensions 7 (G-24 Discussion Paper Series,
Paper No. 18, 2002) (“[M]any developing countries have been able to maintain considerable
competition in product markets despite the absence of a formal competition policy.”);
Prasad, supra note 33, at 3 (noting that the global financial crisis exposed both weaknesses
in the regulatory structures of advanced economies and strengths of certain regulatory
systems in emerging markets).
34
Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey of the
Issues, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117, 120–23 (1999) (surveying the various theories
regarding the importance of strong judiciaries to enforce contract and property rights,
restrain government actors, and otherwise protect foreign investors); see also William Ratliff
& Edgardo Buscaglia, Judicial Reform: The Neglected Priority in Latin America, 550
ANNALS AM. ACAD, 59 (1997); Vai-Lam Mui, Contracting in the Shadow of a Corrupt
Court, 155 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 249 (1999).
35
Juan Martinez & Javier Santiso, Financial Markets and Politics: The Confidence
Game in Latin American Emerging Economies, 24 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 363, 364 (2003)
(noting the connection between perceived political instability and real instability in financial
markets in emerging markets). More corruption is an indirect negative consequence of weak
political institutions. See Daniel Lederman et al., Accountability and Corruption: Political
Institutions Matter (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2708, 2001)
(“[P]olitical institutions affect corruption through two channels: political accountability and
the structure of provision of public goods.”); Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.
J. ECON. 681 (1995) (showing that corruption lowers economic growth by lowering
investment); Beata S. Javorcik & Shang-Jin Wei, Corruption and Cross-Border Investment
in Emerging Markets: Firm-Level Evidence (Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research,
Working Paper No. 062009, 2009) (showing that corruption lowers FDI and pushes the
remaining FDI towards joint ventures, which technologically advanced firms disfavor).
36
Krishna G. Palepu & Tarun Khanna, Institutional Voids and Policy Challenges in
Emerging Markets, 5 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 71, 71 (1998); see also Garry D. Bruton et al.,
Institutional Differences and the Development of Entrepreneurial Ventures: A Comparison
of the Venture Capital Industries in Latin America and Asia, 40 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 762, 771
(2009) (finding that the different institutional reforms undertaken in Latin America and Asia
have led to differing levels of entrepreneurship).
37
Edda Zoli, Financial Development in Emerging Europe: The Unfinished Agenda 3
(Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 07/245, 2007) (“Financial development is often
associated with improved economic performance, as deep, liquid, diversified, and stable
financial markets allow efficient intermediation of funds, facilitate risk diversification, and
tend to favor growth in the long run. Moreover, strong local markets can offer a stable
source of financing for private and public sectors, helping them cope with possibly volatile
external capital flows.”); Jin Zhang et al., Financial Development and Economic Growth:
Recent Evidence from China, 40 J. COMP. ECON. 393, 393–400 (2012) (reviewing literature
on the subject of financial development and growth tending to show a positive correlation
between the two); José Luís Oreiro, Capital Mobility, Real Exchange Rate Appreciation, and
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goes beyond merely quantifying economic growth. On the one hand, the
label suggests that an EME is likely to enjoy a bright economic future and a
more powerful voice in world economic fora. On the other hand, the label
also recognizes long histories of economic failures and areas of uncertainty
that could impede the EME’s positive trajectory. Brazil epitomizes this
uncertainty. Its long history of economic underperformance, recent
dramatic reforms, and unrealized potential make it an intriguing example of
a truly emerging market.
III. THE PRE-EMERGENT BRAZIL
The “pre-emergent” Brazil is marked by four periods of economic
underperformance. The first period covers Brazil’s post-independence
economic stagnation in the nineteenth century. The second was a period of
high economic growth that commenced in the early twentieth century and
came to an end with the debt crisis of the early 1980s. The third was a
period of economic struggle during Latin America’s “lost decade.” The
fourth period included significant economic reforms that set the stage for
Brazil’s elevation to an EME.
A. Post-Independence Brazil
Unlike its Spanish-American peers, Brazil did not gain its
independence from Portugal through an armed revolution, but rather by
becoming a separate empire headed by a member of the Portuguese royal
family.38 Though this process prevented Brazil from fracturing into smaller
Asset Price Bubbles in Emerging Economies: A Post Keynesian Macroeconomic Model for a
Small Open Economy, 28 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 317, 319 (2005) (“[F]inancial markets in
emerging countries . . . have a low degree of organization, which produces a great volatility
in asset prices when compared to the fluctuations in asset prices observed in the financial
markets of developed countries.”); Peter J. Morgan & Mario B. Lamberte, Strengthening
Financial Infrastructure (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 345, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2006983. Emerging market financial systems have, however, been
generally less affected by the global financial crisis than those in advanced economies.
Prasad, supra note 33, at 4. Inequality among a country’s population hinders overall
economic potential by encouraging inefficient allocation of credit. Lending institutions view
the very poor as credit risks, and thus do not lend to them except by charging higher interest
rates or requiring collateral as security for loans. These requirements work to prevent many
of a nation’s poor from gaining access to credit or force them to use that credit more
restrictively to ensure their ability to repay, both of which prevent the credit from being used
as productively as it would be otherwise. If a whole segment of the population is not fully
participating in the economy, the economy does not function at maximum capacity or
efficiency. FRANCISCO H.G. FERREIRA ET AL., INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
BRAZIL xvii (2004).
38
RIORDAN ROETT, THE NEW BRAZIL 15 (2010). The Portuguese royal family fled to
Brazil in 1807 after Napoleon invaded the Iberian Peninsula. Dom Pedro I decided to stay in
Brazil and rule it as a separate empire after the rest of the family returned to Portugal. The
arrival of the monarchy is when Brazil first opened to international trade with Portugal’s
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states as the former Spanish colonies did, it also prevented any real societal
or economic change from occurring.39 The country and its economy
continued to be dominated by the land-owning class propelled by the free
labor of African slaves that had dominated during the colonial period.40 In
1822, just prior to the establishment of the new empire, Brazil had the
lowest GDP per capita of any New World colony and depended largely on
sugar and cotton exports.41 By the time the empire ended at the end of the
nineteenth century, coffee had supplanted sugar and cotton as the country’s
principal export, industrialization was still far off, and the new government
was responsible for a sizeable debt left to it by the empire.42
The monarchy outlawed slavery in 1888, and the country peacefully
transitioned to a republic the following year.43 The “First Republic” (1889–
1930) was a decentralized government in which the states had expansive
powers.44 The central government did, however, play a key role in
supporting the coffee boom in São Paulo that drove the national economy.45
The First Republic also saw the rise of “Ordem e Progresso” (Order and
Progress) as a national mantra that sought “modernization,” mostly through
militarization.46 It was the newly strengthened military, not surprisingly,
that brought about the end of the First Republic.47 When the political
climate stagnated during the first quarter of the twentieth century, it was
young military officers who first challenged the old politics of the ruling

allies, especially Britain. Id. at 24–25.
39
Id. at 19.
40
Id. at 21–22.
41
John H. Coatsworth, Why is Brazil “Underdeveloped” and What Can Be Done About
It?, 6 HARV. REV. LATIN AM. 7, 7 (2007); ROETT, supra note 38, at 29.
42
ROETT, supra note 38, at 28, 32. Coffee’s ascension was largely aided by British
capital and engineers who built the railroads to connect the coffee producing regions to the
port at Santos. Id. at 28.
43
Id. at 15. The desire to be an influential nation drove much of the debate regarding
slavery prior to its abolishment. Abolitionists feared that Brazil could not become a
powerful, modern nation if it was the last country to abolish slavery, while the pro-slavery
politicians argued that Brazil could not become a global power unless it was perceived as a
white nation. The country eventually settled on a compromise: slavery was abolished and
European immigrants were recruited to serve as cheap labor and reinforce the white
population. Id. at 28–29.
44
Id. at 15. Decentralization came about due to the growing influence of the Sao Paolo
state (the home of the coffee boom) that felt oppressed by the Rio de Janeiro based central
government. Id. at 29. The states’ powers at this time included taxation of exports and the
creation of separate militaries. Id. at 32.
45
Id. at 15. Though coffee drove the economy, Roett argues that coffee’s success
restricted growth in other sectors as it attracted such a large percentage of total investment.
Id. at 35.
46
Id. at 30. “Ordem e Progresso” is still emblazoned on the Brazilian flag today.
47
ROETT, supra note 38, at 36.

92

Emerging Economies After the Global Financial Crisis
33:81 (2012)

elite in both the military and civilian world.48 The movement started by
those young officers came to a head in 1930 when a democratically-elected
president was forced out of office in favor of the man who had been runner
up in the election—former finance minister Getúlio Vargas.49
B. Early Twentieth Century to the Debt Crisis of the 1980s
Though the Brazilian economy experienced its first stretch of sustained
growth in the last years of the First Republic, it was under Getúlio Vargas
that the Brazilian economy began to modernize.50 Under Vargas, the focus
of Brazil’s economic policies was achieving self-sufficiency and economic
independence through state-led development initiatives.51 To support his
efforts and dilute the influence of the agricultural oligarchs, Vargas
immediately sought the support of urban labor, the burgeoning middle
class, and the Roman Catholic Church.52 Though in the broadest sense his
outreach to these groups was political, his specific policies would help
foster economic development in the future.53 Indeed, Brazil averaged four
percent growth annually throughout the 1930s while most of the developed
world was mired in the Great Depression.54 In 1937, Vargas consolidated
his reforms after a self-coup of sorts allowed him to retain executive power
despite a constitutional limit to one term as president.55 Vargas branded the
new political reality the “Estado Novo” (“New State”).56
After announcing the “New State,” Vargas strengthened his drive for
industrialization by focusing state investment in the steel and oil sectors—

48

Id. at 35–36.
Id. Getúlio Vargas was the first Brazilian leader that was not part of the “agrarian
aristocracy” that had ruled Brazil during the entire First Republic. He ruled Brazil for
eighteen years in various capacities that Roett labels “provisional president” (1930–1934),
“indirectly elected chief executive” (1934–1937), “soft dictator” (1937–1945), and directly
elected president (1951–1954). Id. at 37.
50
See Coatsworth, supra note 41, at 7 (noting that from 1913 to 1980, Brazil grew faster
than any other country in the Western Hemisphere).
51
Leonardo Martinez-Diaz & Lael Brainard, Brazil: The “B” Belongs in the BRICs, in
BRAZIL AS AN ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER? 5 (Leonardo Martinez-Diaz & Lael Brainard eds.,
2009).
52
ROETT, supra note 38, at 38–39.
53
Id. at 38. For example, education was a large focus of Vargas’ outreach to the middle
class whose loyalty he hoped to win. He opened the first Brazilian university in São Paulo in
1934 mainly in the hopes of educating the next generation of public administrators, but also
to ensure professional opportunities existed for the middle class to prevent members from
falling to a lower class. Id. at 38–39.
54
GORDON, supra note 17, at 14.
55
ROETT, supra note 38, at 38. Vargas himself had approved the 1934 constitution that
limited him to one term that would have ended in 1938. Id. at 39.
56
Id. at 41.
49
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the first vestiges of import substitution in heavy industry.57 Despite these
efforts, Brazil’s economy was still largely dependent on coffee, and
industrialization was slow.58 Like with his predecessor, the military
peacefully pushed Vargas out of power in 1945 due to his overzealous
attempts to further consolidate power.59 Despite the political backlash, the
new government did little to change Brazil’s economic course.60 Though
Brazil’s GDP grew at an average of six percent per year between 1947 and
1962, the government often employed unorthodox economic policies.61
The country struggled with balance-of-payment issues for several years
leading the government to impose exchange rate controls from 1947 to
1953 to help depress an over-valued currency, and to introduce import
licensing requirements to stem the flow of imports.62 Though it was Vargas
who first pushed for import substitution, especially during his final term as
president in the early 1950s, it was his successor, Juscelino Kubitschek
(1956–1961), who made import substitution the cornerstone of an economic
policy he claimed would produce fifty years of development during his
five-year term.63
Despite credit often going to either Vargas or Kubitschek, the Banco
57

Id.; GORDON, supra note 17, at 41. Policies that fit the import substitution mold date
to the nineteenth century, but early import substitution was focused on simpler consumer
goods. ROETT, supra note 38, at 41. Brazil’s first forays into import substitution also had
more to do with achieving balance-of-payments equilibrium than industrialization. Werner
Baer & Issac Kerstenetzky, Import Substitution and Industrialization in Brazil, 54 AM.
ECON. REV. 411, 413–14 (1964). Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) was an
immensely popular policy throughout Latin America from the 1950s to the 1970s. Argentine
economist Raul Prebisch developed the policy during his time with the United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA, now ECLAC). The literature on import
substitution is vast. See, e.g., ANN O. KRUEGER, TRADE POLICIES AND DEVELOPING NATIONS
(1995); Albert O. Hirschman, The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization
in Latin America, 82 Q. J. ECON. 1 (1968); RAUL PREBISCH, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
OF LATIN AMERICA AND ITS PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS (1950); Werner Baer, Import Substitution
and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and Interpretations, 7 LATIN AM. RES.
REV. 95 (1972); Henry J. Bruton, A Reconsideration of Import Substitution, 36 J. ECON. LIT.
903 (1998). Vargas’ decision to invest in steel was driven mostly by the high war-time
demand and the financial assistance the United States provided in return for Brazil’s military
assistance to the Allied Forces. In 1938, Vargas nationalized all oil production, sparking
years of debate surrounding the government’s proper role in the sector. ROETT supra note
38, at 41–42.
58
ROETT, supra note 38, at 42. In 1940, Brazil’s infrastructure was still sub-par and
two-thirds of adults were illiterate—both of which inhibited Brazil’s economic development.
GORDON, supra note 17, at 14.
59
ROETT, supra note 38, at 43.
60
Id. at 44.
61
Martinez-Diaz & Brainard, supra note 51, at 2; ROETT, supra note 38, at 45.
62
ROETT, supra note 38, at 45. The over-valued currency was of special concern to the
export-driven economy. Id.
63
GORDON, supra note 17, at 41; ROETT, supra note 38, at 48.
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do Brasil was actually the first source of import substitution policies
specifically targeted at industrialization.64 It issued a decree in 1955 that
allowed entrepreneurs easy access to foreign capital if the government
deemed their proposed investments desirable for Brazil’s development.65 In
addition, Brazil changed its “Law of Similars” to make it easier for
domestic producers to successfully apply for tariff protection against
foreign competition.66 The government also directly supported various
industries.67 During Kubitschek’s term, the government invested heavily in
the automotive, shipbuilding, and petrochemical industries as part of his
“Programa de Metas” (“Goals Program”).68 These import substitution
policies helped Brazil develop rapidly.69 However, while the automotive
industry grew to be very successful, other government-targeted industries
saw mixed results.70 Moreover, import substitution gave rise to two
lingering problems: inflation and regional inequality.71
64
Baer & Kerstenetzky, supra note 57, at 414. Banco do Brasil is a state-owned
commercial bank that acted as a quasi-central bank until the government created an official
central bank (Banco Central do Brasil) in 1964. Histórico, BANCO CENTRAL DO BRAZIL,
http://www.bc.gov.br/?HISTORIABC (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
65
Baer & Kerstenetzky, supra note 57, at 414.
66
Id. Any manufacturer that produced or intended to produce a good similar to one that
was currently imported could apply for tariff protections starting early in the twentieth
century. The change in the 1950s made any granted protections much stronger by raising
tariffs and exchange rate requirements. Id.
67
Id. Much of this government money went through the newly established Brazilian
Development Bank (known by its Portuguese acronym, BNDES) and state-run enterprises.
Id.
68
GORDON, supra note 17, at 42.
69
From 1947 to 1952, Brazil’s economy grew at an average rate of six percent per year.
By the end of Kubitschek’s presidency, growth had reached nearly eight percent per year.
Industrialization continued as Brazil began to produce more consumer durable goods and
capital goods. Rural to urban migration also nearly doubled. ROETT, supra note 38, at 48;
GORDON, supra note 17, at 16. There is some debate as to the effects of ISI on export
diversity. Gordon argues that ISI did help diversify exports, while Kerstenetzky argues that
any export diversification was minimal. GORDON, supra note 17, at 43; Baer & Kerstenetzky
supra note 57, at 424. Both agree that agriculture was almost completely ignored during the
period, which, due to its historical domination of Brazilian exports, essentially guaranteed a
certain amount of export diversification. GORDON, supra note 17, at 43; Baer &
Kerstenetzky, supra note 57, at 424.
70
GORDON, supra note 17, at 41–43; Baer & Kerstenetzky, supra note 57, at 421. The
automotive industry was successful not only because it eventually manufactured cars at
globally competitive prices, but also because it spawned an entire network of related
economic activity as automobiles that became a popular consumer item for middle-class
Brazilians. Service stations, roadside motels, technical schools, and other business sprang up
throughout the country supporting both new consumption and new jobs. GORDON, supra
note 17, at 41–42.
71
GORDON, supra note 17, at 43; BAER, supra note 18, at 67–68. Though Brazil
eventually conquered high inflation, as discussed infra Part III.D, regional inequality is an
issue to this day. See, e.g., Carlos Alberto Manso et al., Retornos da Educação e o
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The structuralist economic theorists who developed the idea of import
substitution industrialization believed that inflation was a necessary
component of rapid growth.72 This belief allowed policy makers to
continuously maintain a loose monetary policy while building large deficits
by spending on large projects and increasing the minimum wage faster than
was necessary to keep up with the cost of living.73 Brazil’s excellent
growth during the Kubitschek years served as proof of the wisdom of
structuralist economics, but only temporarily.74
Brazil’s short-lived democratic stability came to an end with the
election of Jânio Quadros in 1960.75 Quadros resigned from office in
August of 1961 after only eight months following several unsuccessful
attempts to expand executive power.76 The military, however, refused to
allow his vice president João Goulart to return from a diplomatic visit to
China to assume the presidency due to fears that Goulart held socialist
economic views.77
After several weeks of tension and political
maneuvering, the military allowed Goulart to return to Brazil and assume
the presidency with reduced executive powers.78 The conflict sapped the
government’s legitimacy, weakened institutional stability, and halted the
country’s economic growth79—all of which opened the door for another
military takeover in early 1964.80
The ensuing military regime’s economic policies sought to control
inflation (which had become an obvious problem during the first years of
the 1960s) by increasing savings via reforming capital markets, attracting
foreign capital to finance large-scale industrial production, and investing
heavily in infrastructure and state-owned enterprises (parastatals).81 The
military government’s first policy actions focused on reducing wasteful
Desequilíbrio Regional no Brasil, 64 REV. BRASILEIRA DE ECONOMIA 115 (2010).
72
GORDON, supra note 17, at 44–50.
73
Id.
74
Id. Though the wisdom of structuralist economics was at least debatable for the next
two decades, structuralism was almost completely discredited as an economic theory
following the debt crisis. See Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, Development Economics and the
World Bank’s Identity Crisis, 2 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 211 (1995).
75
ROETT, supra note 38, at 50.
76
Id.; see also GORDON, supra note 17, at 53–54 (discussing the possible political
reasons behind Quadros’ abrupt resignation).
77
GORDON, supra note 17, at 51.
78
Id.
79
BAER, supra note 18, at 71–72. After peaking at 10.3% growth in 1961, economic
growth “fell to 5.3%, 1.5%, and 2.4% in 1962, 1963, and 1964, respectively.” Id. at 72.
Meanwhile, inflation reached 100% in 1964. Id.
80
GORDON, supra note 17, at 52–53.
81
BAER, supra note 18, at 73; Anthony Galano III, International Monetary Fund
Response to the Brazilian Debt Crisis: Whether the Effects of Conditionality Have
Undermined Brazil’s National Sovereignty?, 6 PACE INT’L L. REV. 323, 325–26 (1994).
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spending, increasing tax collection, and removing some price restrictions—
all of which were generally successful.82 The budget deficit steadily fell
from 4.3% of GDP in 1963 to 0.3% in 1971, and inflation fell to about
20%.83 These adjustments set the stage for the so-called “Brazilian
Miracle,” lasting from 1968 to 1973, when the country’s economy grew
more than ten percent each year.84 Changes to capital market regulations
increased investment, which the government then directed towards specific
industries through tax incentives.85 These policies helped dramatically
diversify the country’s exports.86
Some observers argue that state control of the economy through the tax
code and parastatals contributed more to the Miracle than market forces
did.87 However, the Miracle had a very troublesome side effect: income
inequality skyrocketed to one of the highest levels in the world—an issue
that persists today.88
C. Brazil’s Debt Crisis of the 1980s
The military government’s drive to industrialize Brazil led the country
to spend vast amounts of borrowed money on the infrastructure necessary to
support industrial production.89 This increased borrowing coincided with
the return of import substitution policies in the second half of the 1970s
aimed at increasing domestic production of steel, copper, aluminum,
fertilizers, and capital goods while simultaneously continuing the drive to

82

BAER, supra note 18, at 73.
Id. at 73–74.
84
Martinez-Diaz & Brainard, supra note 51, at 2; BAER, supra note 18, at 74. Foreign
direct investment also skyrocketed from $84 million per year from 1965–1969 to $1 billion
per year from 1973–1976. BAER supra note 18, at 77. Note, however, that this period was
also the high point for human rights abuses during the military dictatorship. Id. at 88.
85
BAER, supra note 18, at 74.
86
Id. at 77. Coffee—traditionally Brazil’s staple export—saw its percentage of total
export volume fall from 42% in the mid-1960’s to 12.6% in 1974, while manufactures rose
from around 7% to 27%. Id.
87
Id. at 78.
88
GORDON, supra note 17, at 21. Brazil’s inequality grabbed global attention in the mid1970’s when World Bank President Robert McNamara singled the country out as an
example of an economically-prosperous developing country that was doing little to help the
majority of its populace. BAER, supra note 18, at 88.
89
Galano, supra note 81, at 325. Though this borrowing is unanimously accepted as the
main cause of the 1982 Brazilian debt default, some authors argue that this spending created
the current competitive advantage Brazil holds in agribusiness and biofuel production.
Martinez-Diaz & Brainard, supra note 51, at 6. The parastatals alone would come to account
for 46% of Brazil’s total foreign debt in 1981. Galano argues that Brazil relied on foreign
lending instead of opening its industries to foreign direct investment because the military
was fearful of the potential of foreign economic influence that could come with FDI.
Galano, supra note 81, at 326.
83
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improve infrastructure.90 When the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) raised oil prices in 1973 and 1979, Brazil had to double
the amount it spent on imported oil (80% of all oil it consumed)—money it
borrowed at floating interest rates from foreign (mostly U.S.) commercial
banks flush with petrodollar deposits from OPEC countries.91 Brazil’s
government justified relying on debt to finance its growth by claiming that
the new export capacity would lead to a trade surplus that would in turn
increase the amount of foreign reserves available to a level easily sufficient
to repay creditors in the long run.92
From 1978 to 1981, the United States compounded Brazil’s budget
issues by raising interest rates, which increased debt service payments for
Brazil and several other Latin American countries.93 In 1982, Mexico
defaulted on its foreign debts, instantly drying up foreign sources of capital
for many Latin American countries, including Brazil.94 With no access to
foreign capital, Brazil was unable to pay its debts and continue spending on
its industrialization program.95 In 1983, it had no other choice but to
undergo a substantial external debt restructuring and turn to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)96—a lender Brazil had long avoided
because of the strict conditions put on loans—for the financing it needed.97
90
BAER, supra note 18, at 88–90. These goals were part of the Second National
Development Plan. Most of the plan involved expanding the activities of parastatals.
Though the increased spending was a direct cause of the debt crisis, the policies were at least
successful at keeping growth rates around seven percent per year for the rest of the 1970s.
Id. at 90.
91
Galano, supra note 81, at 328; BAER, supra note 18, at 87. Brazil’s import bill for
petroleum rose from $6.2 billion in 1973 to $12.6 billion in 1974, and the military
government—which changed leaders in 1974—made a conscious decision to spend the
additional money to ensure the rapid growth would continue. BAER, supra note 18, at 87.
Baer also notes that the floating interest rates were initially very low, which made it easier to
rationalize the borrowing. Id. Martinez-Diaz and Brainard note that this oil shock pushed
Brazil to invest heavily in energy independence, the result being that Brazil now derives
46% of its energy from renewable sources as compared to an average of just 6% in OECD
countries. Martinez-Diaz & Brainard, supra note 51, at 7–8.
92
BAER, supra note 18, at 90.
93
Id. at 93; Galano, supra note 81, at 328. Brazil compounded its problems by ending
some export subsidies, thereby exposing the overvaluation of the currency. which the
government subsequently devalued gradually. BAER, supra note 18, at 93.
94
Galano, supra note 81, at 329; BAER, supra note 18, at 100.
95
Galano, supra note 81, at 329; BAER, supra note 18, at 100.
96
The IMF “is an organization of 188 countries, working to foster global monetary
cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high
employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world.”
About the IMF, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/about.htm (last visited
July 8, 2012).
97
Galano, supra note 81, at 329; BAER, supra note 18, at 101. On the debt crisis, see
generally Enrique R. Carrasco, The 1980s: The Debt Crisis & The Lost Decade, U. IOWA
CENTER FOR INT’L FIN. & DEV. E-BOOK, http://blogs.law.uiowa.edu/ebook/uicifd-ebook/part-
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The IMF held vast power over Brazil.98 As conditions to receiving
IMF loans, Brazil was forced to devalue its currency, cut public spending,
freeze all wages, reduce the level of subsidized credit available, raise taxes,
and cut the amount of foreign borrowing by state-owned enterprises.99
After beginning to implement these reforms in 1983, Brazil’s GDP fell four
percent, employment fell twelve percent, and inflation rose above two
hundred percent.100
In 1985, the military regime handed power to a civilian government
led by José Sarney, whose main economic task was to control inflation.101
Though the economic regime the IMF imposed on Brazil in 1982 had
successfully lowered Brazil’s budget deficit and restored growth by 1984,102
it did nothing to control inflation; indeed, inflation quadrupled from 1982 to
1986.103 In the hope of curbing inflation as quickly as possible, Sarney
introduced the “Cruzado Plan” in early 1986.104 The plan introduced a new
currency (the cruzado) and froze prices and exchange rates after deindexing the economy (prices were no longer pegged to the rate of
inflation).105 Though originally successful, the Cruzado Plan had unraveled
by February 1987, and inflation returned as strong as ever.106 By the time
Sarney’s term ended in 1990, prices were increasing by eighty percent per
month.107
D. Brazil in the 1990s
The 1990s was a critical decade of reform that set the stage for Brazil’s
phenomenal growth in recent years. In 1990, Fernando Collor de Mello
became the first democratically-elected president of Brazil in nearly thirty
1-v-1980s-debt-crisis-lost-decade (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
98
Galano, supra note 81, at 337.
99
Id. at 339–40; BAER, supra note 18, at 101.
100
Galano, supra note 81, at 340.
101
ALBERT FISHLOW, STARTING OVER: BRAZIL SINCE 1985, 34 (2011).
102
BAER, supra note 18, at 102. GDP growth reached 4.5% in 1984 and 8.3% in 1985.
Id.
103
FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 34.
104
Id. at 36.
105
Id. Sarney looked to Argentina’s and Israel’s experiences to develop this heterodox
shock plan. Id.
106
Id. at 38. The Cruzado Plan’s initial success was ultimately the cause of its failure.
After the plan was announced, real money held by businesses and individuals soared, which
helped spur consumption and increase imports. Real wages increased along with
government spending and overall demand. External factors also drove demand: lower
international interest rates, falling oil prices, and a devalued dollar. This rapid increase in
demand is what brought inflation back to life, though only after Sarney and his party won an
enormous majority in the 1986 elections that took place after real wages had risen but while
inflation was still low. Id. at 36–38.
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Id. at 39.
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years.108 His main economic policy goals were price stabilization,
privatization, and increasing market competition.109 He quickly adopted a
liberal international trade regime by lowering barriers to imports and
privatizing many state-owned businesses110—the first of a decade of reform
that set the stage for Brazil’s current growth.111 His policies, however, were
not effective at containing inflation, which continued to be a problem until
1994112 when Collor’s successor Itamar Franco announced the “Real Plan”
designed by Minister of Finance, and future President, Fernando Henrique
Cardoso.113
The Real Plan was more comprehensive than any of its
predecessors.114 The Plan introduced a new currency (the real), de-indexed
the economy, tightened monetary policy, introduced a managed-float
exchange rate system, cut spending, and increased taxes.115 There were also
provisions in the Plan to lower tariff barriers for foreign importers whose
competition, in theory, would prevent Brazilian monopolies and oligopolies
from unilaterally raising prices.116 Tariffs ultimately fell from an average of
fifty-one percent in 1988 to fourteen percent in 1994.117
The launch of the Real Plan was the first time Brazil showed the
economic discipline necessary to attract the foreign capital investments that
108

GORDON, supra note 17, at 30.
Id.
110
See José Luis de Salles Freire & José Emilio Nunes Pinto, Privatization in Brazil, 17
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 689 (1993). Between 1991 and 2001, the Brazilian
government sold $110 billion worth of assets to become “privitaziation’s poster child.”
Nevertheless, thirteen of Brazil’s one hundred largest firms are still state-owned to this day,
including the largest—Petrobras, the behemoth state-controlled oil company. Martinez-Diaz
& Brainard, supra note 51, at 6.
111
Juan de Onis, Brazil’s Big Moment: A South American Giant Wakes Up, 87 FOREIGN
AFF. 110, 117–18 (2008).
112
FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 40–41. Collor tried to contain inflation with his own
plan, which involved a new currency and a freeze on prices and wages, but his plan failed
just as its predecessors had. Id.
113
See generally id. at 41–44. Collor was impeached in 1992 on charges of corruption,
but resigned before the Brazilian Senate could hold a trial. GORDON, supra note 17, at 30.
114
BAER, supra note 18, at 200. The biggest difference was that the Real Plan included a
fiscal restraint component—the “immediate action plan.” Introduced in 1993, the immediate
action plan included a $6 billion cut in spending (9% of federal spending), improved tax
collection, and forced the state governments to repay loan arrears to get new loan guarantees.
Id.
115
FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 41–44; BAER, supra note 18, at 200; Benedict Clements,
The Real Plan, Poverty, and Income Distribution in Brazil, 1997 FIN. & DEV. 44, 44–45
(1997).
116
William C Gruben & John H. Welch, Banking and Currency Crisis Recovery:
Brazil’s Turnaround of 1999, ECON. & FIN. POL’Y REV., no. Q IV, 2001, at 12, 13.
117
Id.; BAER, supra note 18, at 204 (noting that tariffs fell from 32.2% in 1990 to 14.2%
in 1994).
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have propelled Brazil’s growth.118 Inflation fell from just over fifty percent
in June 1994 to less than one percent in September 1994.119 Lower inflation
has the practical effect of raising real wages by reducing prices, which in
turn increases the buying power of wage earners and effectively reduces
poverty.120 Not surprisingly, the Plan pleased the vast majority of
Brazilians and propelled Fernando Henrique Cardoso to victory in the 1994
presidential election.121
In his first term in office, Cardoso continued the privatization process
started by President Collor, stabilized a weak banking sector, and started a
conditional income transfer program to help the poor.122 Though the Real
Plan is widely considered a success, and President Cardoso is credited with
stabilizing the Brazilian economy, he failed to properly address the
country’s ever-growing fiscal deficit.123 Concerns over the sustainability of
its debt began to arise just as the developing world experienced a series of
financial crises.124 Brazil was not immune from the contagion of the Asian
financial crisis of the late 1990s, when speculators bet against the currencies
of several countries, successfully forcing those countries to devalue their
respective currencies.125 Brazil’s currency came under attack in 1997 due
to fears related to the country’s large debt.126 Capital inflows fell
dramatically, followed by renewed capital flight after the 1998 Russian
bond default.127 The Russian crisis pushed investors to become wary of
EMEs with high debt levels—including Brazil, where it is likely that
investors had consistently overlooked high fiscal deficits due to the allure of
high interest rates.128 To stave off speculation and prevent capital outflows,
Brazil raised its already-high interest rates, making speculation less
profitable and investing in the country more remunerative.129
118

STRATFOR, Ignore Brazil’s Election, Here Are The Real Problems Facing The
Country, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 5, 2010, 8:00 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/brazilgeopolitical-situations-2010-10#ixzz1EFD17U2r.
119
BAER, supra note 18, at 201. Though inflation went up some throughout the next
year, it never went above 5.15% in 1995. Id.
120
Id. at 203–04, 254. Not surprisingly, consumption rose 16.3% in the first year
following the introduction of the Real Plan. Id. at 203.
121
De Onis, supra note 111, at 118.
122
Id.; BAER, supra note 18, at 211.
123
Gruben, supra note 116, at 14; BAER, supra note 18, at 205; FISHLOW, supra note
101, at 45.
124
Gruben, supra note 116, at 14.
125
Id. at 14–15. Markets also exerted some pressure on the real during the 1994–95
Mexican crisis, but the pressure quickly faded after Brazil devalued the real slightly in the
first half of 1995. BAER, supra note 18, at 204–05.
126
FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 46.
127
Id. at 46–47.
128
BAER, supra note 18, at 210–11.
129
Gruben, supra note 116, at 13–14; FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 46.
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The hike in interest rates caused domestic industrial production to fall,
which decreased Brazil’s exports.130 Therefore, to pay for necessary
imports, Brazil had to borrow and increase its debt even further.131 The
increased indebtedness, combined with President Cardoso’s inability to
convince the Brazilian Congress to pass fiscal restraint legislation, once
again attracted the attention of currency speculators.132 Brazil then received
a $41.5 billion loan from the IMF, the World Bank, and the United States to
help it defend against speculators.133 The loan, of course, came with
conditionality.134 Within one month of receiving the loan, the Brazilian
Congress had approved about sixty percent of the required reform measures
before reaching an impasse on pension reform. 135 Pressure on the real had
been easing steadily as Congress instituted the reforms, but capital outflows
accelerated immediately following the pension-reform failure.136 The fatal
blow, however, did not come from foreign currency speculators, but rather
from former president and then-governor of the state of Minas Gerais
Itamar Franco, who announced that the state would no longer repay its
debts to the federal government.137 Capital outflows skyrocketed from
already high levels, forcing Brazil to devalue the real by nine percent and
eventually allowing it to float freely on international markets.138
The crisis, however, did not cause a long-lasting disruption of the flow
of foreign capital into Brazil.139 Cardoso’s macroeconomic policies had
proven to be successful—public sector revenues were rising, which gave
Brazil more money to pay its debts, privatization had reduced the losses
borne by the state, and increased agricultural production kept food prices
stable—all of which helped blunt the effect of the crisis.140 Banking
reforms had forced banks to keep more cash on hand by lowering
acceptable leverage rates, ensuring that banks had sufficient capital to pay
fleeing investors without causing banks to fail or creating risk to the entire
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Gruben, supra note 116, at 15.
Id.
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Id. at 13–15.
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Id.; BAER, supra note 18, at 216.
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BAER, supra note 18, at 216.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.; Gruben, supra note 116, at 15.
138
Gruben, supra note 116, at 15. The IMF has since admitted that it should have
encouraged Brazil to give up its crawling peg exchange rate system earlier, a move the IMF
did not take due to lack of internal agreement. FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 46–47.
139
De Onis, supra note 28, at 111. Indeed, many observers predicted a near total
collapse of the Brazilian economy with the return of double-digit inflation and a six percent
decrease in real income. FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 47.
140
De Onis, supra note 28, at 112.
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banking system.141
The crisis quickly subsided and the real stabilized.142 Cardoso was
able to finish his second term by capping discretionary spending and raising
tax revenues—both of which helped address the longstanding issue of everrising debt, but failed to bring the dramatic change necessary to put Brazil’s
debt problems in the past.143 Cardoso was constitutionally barred from
running for a third term, and was replaced by Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva in
2002.144
IV. BRAZIL EMERGES
It has only been within the last few years that Brazil has began to reap
the benefits of nearly two decades of reform. Brazil’s strong performance
through the global financial crisis highlighted Brazil’s newfound stability.
Much of the reason for this strong performance can be traced to a series of
specific policy decisions that have attacked glaring issues hindering
economic growth. Brazil has improved its infrastructure, eased the
demands of burdensome regulatory schemes, and reformed its judiciary
with the goal of speeding the judicial process. All of those changes
encouraged and facilitated the foreign and domestic investment that has
propelled Brazil’s economy and set the stage for continued growth in the
future.
A. Lula’s Presidency and the Global Financial Crisis
It was under Lula that Brazil joined the ranks of emerging economies.
Though his politics were generally left-of-center, Lula sought to appease
foreign investors during his campaign by promising to honor contracts,
protect private property, assert fiscal discipline, and pay off debts.145 Once
in office, he eliminated nearly all concerns by following the orthodox
economic path of his predecessor.146 He also gave the Central Bank greater
operational autonomy, thereby promoting the development of policies that
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Gruben, supra note 116, at 19–21.
Id.
143
See De Onis, supra note 28, at 114. The Law of Fiscal Responsibility was passed in
May 2000 to comply with the IMF’s demands. The law eliminated public sector deficits and
restricted the government’s ability to incur future debt. FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 47.
144
De Onis, supra note 111, at 118.
145
Id. Lula’s campaign itself did not convince international markets that he supported
orthodox economic policies. In the months leading up to his widely-anticipated election,
foreign inflows became shorter-term and the country’s base interest rate rose 300 basis
points after Lula came in first place in the first election round. FISHLOW, supra note 101, at
50.
146
Id. at 119. Indeed, Lula’s policies were so orthodox that some referred to his first
term as “Cardoso’s third term.” ROETT, supra note 38, at 111.
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furthered economic growth instead of political interests.147 Interest rates
fell to six percent (Cardoso had lowered them from twenty percent to ten
percent despite having to raise them during the Real Crisis), which made it
cheaper for Brazilians to borrow money to expand businesses inside and
outside Brazil.148 He also fostered greater ties with other developing
countries to help decrease Brazil’s dependence on the developed world as a
source of consumers for Brazilian products.149
Like his predecessors, Lula faced a financial crisis when the 2008 U.S.
financial crisis spread globally. However, the crisis was short-lived for
Brazil. Brazil’s GDP shrank slightly in 2009 before returning to booming
growth in 2010, while the U.S. economy was still barely growing in
2011.150 So why did Brazil handle the crisis so well?
Brazil’s strong performance through the global financial crisis is
partially attributable to Brazilian banks’ low exposure to the U.S. mortgagebacked securities market.151 Thanks to President Cardoso’s reforms,
Brazil’s banks were unable to expose themselves to as much risk as other
banks around the globe.152 Brazil’s banking sector also benefited from
having one central regulator—the Central Bank.153 Some observers argue
that having one regulator supervise every aspect of a nation’s banking
activities is more efficient and effective than systems with multiple
regulators responsible for supervising different aspects of the banking
sector, as in the United States.154 Taken in combination, these policies
prevented Brazilian banks from suffering losses so substantial as to require
large bailouts to stay afloat, unlike their U.S. counterparts.
Brazil also benefited from low unemployment and less dependence on
trade with the developed world.155 Low unemployment and trade ties with
the developing world meant that Brazil had access to a large number of

147
Knowledge@Wharton, Lessons from Brazil: Why Is It Bouncing Back While Other
Markets Stumble?, LATIN AM. L. & BUS. REP., Nov. 2009, at 10.
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FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 80.
149
Knowledge@Wharton, supra note 147.
150
GDP Growth (Annual %), supra note 2.
151
Knowledge@Wharton, supra note 147, at 11.
152
Id.
153
The Central Bank played a pivotal role during the crisis, tightening monetary policy
prior to the Lehman Brothers collapse to limit the inflationary effects of government
stimulus spending, then took measures to increase liquidity following the Lehman-induced
credit crunch. Mário Mesquita & Mário Torós, Brazil and the 2008 Panic, in THE GLOBAL
CRISIS AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES 113 (Bank for
Int’l Settlements, BIS Papers Ser. No. 54, 2010).
154
HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 253 (17th ed. 2010); but see Prasad, supra
note 33, at 5–6 (arguing that the global financial crisis exposed flaws in both the U.K.’s
single regulator system and the U.S.’s multiple regulator system).
155
Knowledge@Wharton, supra note 147, at 11.
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consumers to keep demand for Brazilian exports high.156 Those increased
ties were a focal point of Lula’s foreign policy.157 It was, therefore, not
surprising that China overtook the United States as Brazil’s largest trading
partner in 2009.158 Having a diversified profile of consumers made Brazil
less dependent on demand from the developed world, meaning demand for
Brazilian exports stayed high even as demand in the developed world
dropped precipitously.159
None of this is to say that Brazil went through the crisis completely
unscathed. The government did have to provide a stimulus package
amounting to 1.5% of its GDP to spur the economy,160 but that paled in
comparison to the stimulus packages in Japan (fifteen percent of a much
larger GDP) and the United States (seven percent of an even larger GDP).161
Brazil’s unemployment rate also rose slightly during the crisis,162 but has
since hit record lows while the developed world continues to struggle with
high unemployment.163
President Lula da Silva’s greatest success may have been his ability to
increase Brazil’s influence internationally. He led calls for a greater voice
for the developing world in the IMF164 and to shift the main forum for
global economic policy discussions from the G-7 to the G-20, which
includes EMEs such as Brazil.165 Both of these calls were successful—the
156

Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 11. In the 1950s, the United States accounted for 41% of Brazil’s exports, but
by 1997 that number had fallen to 17.7%. Meanwhile, other Latin American countries saw
their share of Brazil’s exports rise from 9.7% in 1967 to 26% in 1997. BAER, supra note 18,
at 229.
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SECRETARIAT FOR SOCIAL COMMUNICATION, PRESIDENCY OF THE FEDERATIVE
REPUBLIC OF BRAZ., TRADE BALANCE – BRAZIL-CHINA TRADE RELATIONS 2 (2011), available
at http://www.brasil.gov.br/para/press/files/fact-sheet-brazil-china-trade. Brazilian exports
to China rose from $1,902 million in 2001 to $30,786 million in 2010. Id. Imports from
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159
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http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2009/01/05/a-look-at-the-worlds-largest-stimulusplans-outside-the-united-states.
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BLOOMBERG
(Mar.
26,
2009
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http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aboxHfYwzfus.
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IMF recently shifted more voting power to EMEs (including Brazil),166 and
the G-20 became the main global economic forum in 2009.167
B. Specific Policies that Have Contributed to Brazil’s Emergence
Several policies have played, and continue to play, an important role in
Brazil’s status as an EME. One such policy is Brazil’s emphasis on
building the infrastructure necessary to support a diverse and thriving
economy. No economy will function at its highest capacity if poor
infrastructure—such as bad roads, insufficient sea ports, lack of
technology—creates inefficiencies at the various stages of production.168
Brazil has spent much of its new wealth improving infrastructure with the
aim of facilitating future economic growth. The most important of such
projects is the “Growth Acceleration Plan” (known by its Portuguese
acronym, PAC), authored by current President Dilma Rousseff while she

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7963704.stm.
166
Press Release, Int’l Monetary Fund, IMF Board of Governors Approves Major Quota
and
Governance
Reforms
(Dec.
16,
2010),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10477.htm. With the shift, EMEs gained an
additional six percent of voting power, while an additional six percent of voting power
shifted from overrepresented countries—both developed and developing—to
underdeveloped countries. Id. The end result is that EMEs have five percent more real
voting power than they had before the shift, and all four BRIC countries are now among the
ten largest vote holders. Id. Brazil’s voting share increased from 1.402% to 2.218%. Id.
167
G20 to be New Global Economy Coordinator, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2009, 1:40 AM)
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/25/us-g20-role-sb-idUSTRE58O0H820090925.
Brazil has not, however, been successful in its demand for a permanent seat on the U.N.
Security Council, though the U.K. recently endorsed its campaign. John Paul Rathbone, UK
Backs Brazil Bid for UN Security Council Seat, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2010),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6718897e-ec1e-11df-9e11-00144feab49a.html. This failure
is due, at least in part, to Brazil’s opposition to sanctions against Iran for continuing to
pursue a nuclear program, and less so due to any economic failure. Alexei Barrionuevo &
Ginger Thompson, Brazil’s Iran Diplomacy Worries U.S. Officials, N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
2010, at A9, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/05/15/world/americas/15lula.html. Brazil
has backed away from its support of Iran under President Rousseff. Simon Romero, Iranian
Adviser Accuses Brazil of Ruining Relations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2012, at A10, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/world/americas/ahmadinejad-adviser-accuses-brazil-ofruining-relations.html. For an argument in support of Brazil becoming a permanent member
of the U.N. Security Council, see David A. Bailey, Pull Up a Seat: Brazil Should Be the Next
Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council, 17 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 83
(2011).
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For example, according to one recent study, Brazilian businesses alone spend R$17
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decay and bureaucracy at ports, a lack of railway capacity, and storage expenses caused by
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was a member of Lula’s cabinet.169
The “Growth Acceleration Plan” is an umbrella term for thousands of
economic development projects across Brazil that began in 2007.170 The
program has several components, but the main goal is to improve the poor
infrastructure that has created a pattern of social exclusion.171 The poor are
more likely to live in areas with bad roads, poor public transportation, few
available jobs, limited or no access to credit, and no mail or commercial
delivery services.172 These and other issues prevent the poor from fully
participating in Brazil’s economy. PAC seeks to remedy this problem by
building or rebuilding homes and roads, and improving sanitation, sewage,
water, and electrical services in the poorest areas of Brazil’s cities.173 To
maximize the program’s impact, the government hires people living in
those neighborhoods to perform the work.174 This feature simultaneously
creates employment in the short-term in areas where unemployment is
disproportionately high, while making changes that should help spur longterm economic growth.175
Regrettably, there are conflicting reports as to whether the projects are
actually being completed.176 President Lula da Silva denied the negative
reports, but admitted that progress had been slower than he hoped, blaming
bureaucracy for the delays.177 The slow progress did not prevent him from
169
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5, 2008), http://www.coha.org/lula%E2%80%99s-brazilian-growth-acceleration-programthe-best-that-government-funding-can-buy/.
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Schaller, supra note 170. The plan originally called for a $235 billion investment in
infrastructure improvement. There were also components meant to address Brazil’s high
regulatory burden. See infra text accompanying notes 217–224; FISHLOW, supra note 101, at
75.
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Schaller, supra note 170.
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Id. PAC’s focus is not only on social inclusion. The infrastructure investment is
separated into three categories, including a category addressing these social needs. Id. The
other two categories are meant to address general road reconstruction, port and airport
building, and energy production, respectively. Id. The social infrastructure accounts for
$170.8 billion ($34.8 billion from the federal government), general infrastructure $58.3
billion ($38 billion from the federal government), and energy $274.8 billion (none of which
came from the federal government). FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 75–76.
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Id.
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announcing an $872 billion extension (PAC II) to the program in March
2010, when PAC I was only fifty percent completed.178 The goal of PAC II
is to increase the country’s energy production capacity, build two million
new homes (to cut the estimated housing deficit to three million homes),
and make infrastructure improvements for the 2014 World Cup and 2016
Olympics to be held in Brazil, including building a high-speed rail to
connect Brazil’s two largest cities, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.179 Once
completed, these projects should greatly expand Brazil’s economic potential
for years to come.
Brazil has further facilitated its economic ascension by opening itself
to the world through new international trade and foreign investment
policies. Since the mid-1990s, Brazil has consistently lowered its import
tariffs while modernizing its overall import system (customs inspections,
payments, etc.), making it cheaper and easier for foreign countries and
companies to sell their products in Brazil.180 Due to these changes, Brazil’s
imports have consistently increased, helping balance Brazil’s current
account surplus.181
The amount of foreign direct investment flowing into Brazil has
steadily increased since President Cardoso introduced the Real Plan in
1994182 thanks, in part, to the high investment returns associated with fast
growth and high interest rates.183 Brazil’s policies have played a role as
well. To begin, a national treatment standard ensures that foreign and
domestic investors are treated equally.184 Unlike many countries, Brazil
does not set a maximum or minimum level for foreign investments, it
allows foreign companies to fully remit profits abroad, and it does not
evaluate the potential effects of investments on the national economy or
ensure that the country will somehow benefit before approving investments,
which makes it easier and more profitable for foreigners to invest in Brazil,
of total PAC resources had been spent, which says nothing about the actual completion of
projects to which funds had been dispersed. FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 77.
178
Loudiyi, supra note 177. Investment in the energy sector makes up about seventy
percent of the Plan. FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 77.
179
Loudiyi, supra note 177. The extension includes $600 billion for energy investments
($255 billion from 2011 to 2014) and $152 billion for housing construction. Id.
180
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tment+in+brazil (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
183
See BAER, supra note 18, at 255 (noting the general increase in the flow of foreign
capital to EMEs). The stabilization of the real, which reduced the cost of doing business in
Brazil, along with the large privatization program and rapid decrease in tariffs have all also
contributed to the growth in FDI. Id.
184
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thereby increasing overall investment.185
Brazil’s large and sophisticated national exchange further facilitates
foreign investment.186 In 2008, the São Paulo Stock Exchange merged with
the mercantile and futures exchange to form BM&FBOVESPA, the largest
exchange in Latin America187 and the fourth-largest exchange in the
world,188 with a market capitalization of $1.546 trillion.189 Disclosure
requirements for listing on this exchange are on par with markets around
the world, giving investors confidence that all relevant information is
available.190 All of these and other efforts have made it easier, safer, and
more profitable for foreigners to invest in Brazil.191
Lastly, as Brazil has grown, it has made a concerted effort to improve
government institutions to make them more efficient for both Brazilians and
foreign investors. Most important among these reforms, at least as far as
encouraging investment is concerned, has been reforming the judicial
system.192 A 2006 constitutional amendment mandated judicial reform and
made judicial expeditiousness a constitutional guarantee—an important step
for a traditionally slow legal system.193 In 2007, the country passed a law
that allows decisions from the Federal Supreme Court (the highest
constitutional court in Brazil) to have precedential value if two-thirds of the
justices concur.194 This change will prevent the courts from having to
decide the same issue repeatedly, making the entire system faster. An
efficient judiciary is cheaper and enforces rights more reliably—two factors
185
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(2003) (“Markets . . . depend on the establishment of an environment in which legal rights,
especially property and contractual rights, are enforced and protected . . . .”) (citations
omitted).
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America’s Powerhouse, 17 LATIN AM. L. & BUS. REP. 13, 16 (2009).
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of keen interest to foreign investors.195
V. CHALLENGES AHEAD
Though Brazil has made substantial progess towards economic
development in the last two decades, several challenges remain. When Lula
handed power over to his successor, Dilma Rousseff (the first female
president of Brazil), his approval rating was over 80% and the economy had
just grown by an estimated 7.5% in 2010.196 He had increased spending
near the end of his term (ostensibly for political reasons), heightening fears
of inflation,197 but President Rousseff promised fiscal restraint while
continuing Lula’s policy of allowing the Central Bank to operate
autonomously to control inflation.198 The promise to cut spending, along
with a promise to cut the nation’s high interest rates, is what investors
believe is necessary to ensure that inflation does not derail Brazil’s current
growth.199 President Rousseff’s first major political victory—getting the
legislature to agree to a lower-than-desired raise in the minimum wage—
surely pleased investors as it showed a commitment to reducing
spending.200 Nevertheless, Rousseff’s presidency has seen its share of
turbulence thus far.201 Economic growth slowed to below three percent in
2011, inflation rose and remains above the Central Bank’s target, and a
series of corruption scandals shifted the focus away from economic
reforms.202
President Rousseff and her successors face a number of challenges as
Brazil seeks to propel itself forward as an emerging economy. First is the
danger of excessive spending, which contributes to high interest rates
(making borrowing more expensive), currency appreciation (hurting
195

Messick, supra note 34, at 121.
Albert Fishlow, Brazil: What’s Next?, AM. SOC’Y, Winter 2011, available at
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TIMES (Feb. 10, 2011, 2:54 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/68b09184-3492-11e0-9ebc00144feabdc0.html.
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Sílvio Guedes Crespo, Imprensa internacional destaca 1ª vitória chave de Dilma, O
ESTADO DE SÃO PAULO (Feb. 17, 2011), http://blogs.estadao.com.br/radareconomico/2011/02/17/imprensa-internacional-destaca-1%C2%AA-vitoria-chave-de-dilma/.
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Paulo Sotero, Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff Makes Her Mark, BBC NEWS (Dec.
29, 2011, 3:58 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-16288184.
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Id. The decreased economic growth is more a result of the ongoing European
sovereign debt crisis than any Brazilian policy. Additionally, inflation has fallen in recent
months. Id. Though the corruption scandals have distracted political discussion, Rousseff’s
willingness to fire high-level officials accused of corruption has made her extremely
popular—her approval rating is currently above seventy percent—which may help her build
support around her economic reform goals in the future. Id.
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exporters by raising the cost of goods produced domestically), and a
complex tax system (raising compliance costs, and in turn, business
costs)—all of which are currently problems in Brazil.203
Second, Brazil continues to depend too heavily on commodity exports
(mainly food and oil) to drive growth.204 Like excessive spending,
commodity exports put upward pressure on the domestic currency by
attracting both foreign currency through investment in commodity sectors
and the hard currency needed to purchase the exports.205 The appreciated
currency negatively affects other sectors of the economy—in Brazil’s case,
the manufacturing sector whose products are now more expensive and,
therefore, less competitive globally—making the country even more
dependent on commodities over time.206 Brazil appears poised to expand its
dependency on commodity exports as it recently discovered huge oil
reserves207 and has made enormous investments in its ethanol and
agricultural sectors.208 These commodities are currently as profitable as
they have ever been for Brazil, but that may have more to do with a global
food shortage and over-speculation in the oil markets driving prices up than
with any economic wisdom of the Brazilian government.209
The
203

Small Earthquake in Brazil’s Planalto, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2011, 8:33 PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/10dc0994-2fcd-11e0-91f800144feabdc0.html#axzz1DbqqHTV7. Spending is also troublesome in that it contributes
substantially to indebtedness. Indebtedness is a problem because it forces countries to spend
foreign reserves on debt servicing rather than maintaining a balance-of-payment equilibrium,
it increases the cost of borrowing over time, and it gives more bargaining power to foreign
creditors when attempting to make policy changes. BAER, supra note 18, at 233–34.
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STRATFOR, supra note 118. Iron, oil, sugar, soy, meat, and coffee make up fortyseven percent of Brazilian exports. Luiz Guilherme Gerbelli, Seis produtos são responsáveis
por metade das exportações brasileiras, O ESTADO DE SÃO PAULO (Mar. 11, 2012, 8:59 PM),
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higher likelihood of civil war. Paul Collier, Primary Commodity Dependence and Africa’s
Future, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 2003: THE
NEW REFORM AGENDA 139, 140–48 (Boris Pleskovic & Nicholas Stern eds., 2003); but see
Nanae Yabuki & Takamasa Akiyama, Is Commodity-Dependence Pessimism Justified?
(World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1600, 1996) (arguing that commodity
dependence is not always correlated with low growth).
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http://www.economist.com/node/18065645.
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2008),
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Prices:
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FORBES
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2011,
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PM),
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government plans to put new oil profits in a sovereign-wealth fund to
prevent increased spending from further pushing up the value of the real,
but whether it will adhere to that policy long-term is yet to be
determined.210 For the time being, an overvalued currency has already
negatively affected Brazil’s manufacturing sector and forced the
government to take strong action.211
Corruption in Brazil is another major challenge.212 Transparency
International, a non-governmental organization that measures corruption
throughout the world, ranks Brazil the seventy-third least corrupt country
out of one hundred eighty-three countries.213 The roots of corruption are far
too complex to fully explain here,214 but it is important to note the
contribution Brazil’s political structure plays in producing corruption.
Brazil’s political system is such that it allows more than twenty political
parties to participate in elections.215 These parties are in a constant
scramble for government money in the form of welfare benefits,
government jobs, and contracts that would help influence voters—a
scramble that leads to corruption and waste that inhibit efficiency and
productivity.216
Third, continuing issues with Brazil’s regulatory and legal framework
impede foreign investment by making it riskier and more expensive to do

why-so-high/ (arguing that high commodity prices are the result of investors looking for
somewhere to “park” the excess liquidity that has come about due to loose monetary policies
globally, especially in the United States over the past few years).
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government has offered manufacturers temporary tax breaks out of a fear that manufacturers
will cut payrolls to try to maintain competitiveness. Id. Large payroll cuts would have a
negative effect on domestic consumption—an important aspect of economic growth. Id.
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Evidence (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. DP8061, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1711074 (arguing that corruption in the form of bribery by public
officials limits the number of firms seeking to enter a given market).
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2011,
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http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
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For an in-depth discussion of the roots of corruption globally, see Vito Tanzi,
Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures, 45 STAFF PAPERS –
INT’L MONETARY FUND 559 (1998).
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De Onis, supra note 111, at 117–20. The proliferation of political parties can be
traced to the 1950’s, when both global concerns about the capitalist model and national
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business in Brazil.217 The National Federation of Industries termed these
extra costs of doing business in Brazil the “Custo Brasil” (“Brazil Cost”).218
Principal among these costs is the high tax burden mentioned above.219
Taxes represent thirty-six percent of Brazil’s GDP compared to only eight
percent in China.220 But besides the high tax burden, Brazil’s tax code is
extremely complex, making compliance a lengthy and expensive process.221
Brazil ranked 150th in the World Bank’s “Doing Business” ranking in
terms of ease of paying taxes.222 It took the World Bank’s hypothetical
company 2,600 hours to fully comply with the tax laws, which would be a
costly endeavor.223
Cumbersome regulations also make starting a business an expensive
ordeal. Regarding the ease of stating a new business, the World Bank study
ranked Brazil 120th in the world.224 It takes an average of one hundred
nineteen days to register a business in Brazil, compared to the regional
average of fifty-four days.225
A slow and inefficient judiciary adds to the Custo Brasil. Brazil’s
courts simply have too large of a caseload to function quickly or
efficiently.226 Though the courts have never been known as exemplars of
efficiency, caseloads have skyrocketed since the country approved the

217
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Id. at 73.
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Id. at 16.
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Id. at 17. Brazilians have a sense of pride of sorts in finding ways around these
regulatory costs, referring to the process of avoiding regulations as “jeitinho.” Business: The
Brazilian Model; Schumpeter, ECONOMIST, Nov. 18, 2010, at 76, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/17522484. “Jeitinho” is a play on the word “jeito,”
meaning path or way. Id.
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Keith S. Rosenn, Judicial Review in Brazil: Developments under the 1988
Constitution, 7 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 291, 311 (2000).
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current constitution in 1988 that grants extensive personal rights.227 The
increase in cases is also attributable to the highest court’s broad original
mandatory jurisdiction.228 Of special concern to foreign investors, the
highest court must approve all requests for recognition of a foreign
judgment.229 Despite having taken steps towards strengthening the concept
of controlling precedent to lower the caseload, it is estimated that ninety
percent of the highest court’s caseload consists of questions that it has
already decided.230 A former president of the Supreme Tribunal attributes
the high judicial caseloads to the government’s bad faith refusals to pay
judgments, instead choosing to appeal cases indefinitely to delay
payment.231
Lastly, inequality is possibly the most commonly known threat to
Brazil’s progress. In spite of Brazil’s phenomenal growth, inequality is still
an impediment: the World Bank has estimated that for every ten percent
increase in poverty there is a corresponding one percent reduction in
economic growth.232 For Brazil, this means that economic growth could
increase by two or three percentage points each year by eliminating
poverty.233 Currently, the top ten percent of the population accounts for
forty-three percent of total consumption, while the bottom ten percent
makes up just under one percent of Brazil’s total consumption.234 While
CEOs in São Paulo make more money than CEOs in New York City,235
over ten million Brazilians live on less than $1.25 per day.236
Brazil’s inequality is not a new phenomenon. It is generally blamed
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number of cases filed in Brazilian courts increased by more than a factor of ten, from about
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Id. at 312. This requirement even includes approval for uncontested divorces. Id.
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Id. at 313. As Rosenn highlights, the repetitive and conflicting nature of decisions is
not a necessary result of having a civil as opposed to common law tradition. There are many
examples of civil law systems that work more efficiently than the Brazilian system. Id.
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Id. Despite all of these problems, it is worth noting that at least one observer has
credited the strength of Brazil’s democracy since 1985, in part, to the quality of the judiciary.
FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 187.
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Coatsworth, supra note 41, at 8.
233
Id.
234
Brazil, supra note 189.
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The Americas: Top Whack; Executive Pay in Brazil, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2011, at 35,
available at www.economist.com/node/18010831 (noting that in 2010, the CEOs in São
Paulo earned an average of over $600,000 per year, while CEOs in New York City earned an
average of about $580,000 per year).
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on unequal educational attainment and unequal land distribution, both of
which have their roots in the colonial era.237 During the colonial era, there
was little need for education in areas heavily populated with slaves,
therefore, there was no educational infrastructure in those areas when
slavery finally ended in 1888.238 The educational attainment gap has only
grown since that time.239 Wealthier, white Brazilians have continuously
dominated politics and have chosen to invest Brazil’s money in the whiter
southern part of the country, while generally ignoring the more heavily
black and indigenous populations of the north, with the same disparities
seen in cities throughout the country.240
To compare Brazilian student achievement to student achievement in
the developed world, President Cardoso entered the country into the
Program for International Student Assessment run by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an international
organization comprised almost exclusively of developed countries.241
Brazil now ranks fifty-third out of sixty-five countries, although it initially
came in last place when fewer countries participated, a mediocre result even
by Latin America’s lower education standards.242
What marginal
improvements there have been can be attributed to President Cardoso’s
decision to mandate minimum per-pupil spending and teacher salaries along
with the “Bolsa Família” (“Family Scholarship”) program.243 President
Rouseff has already targeted improving the educational attainment of
237
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amount per-pupil, especially in poorer areas, which receive less funding than other areas.
FISHLOW, supra note 101, at 190. Besides funding, poor quality teachers are an issue in
Brazil as well. To become a teacher in Brazil, a university student is not required to take
courses on teaching skills or the subject matter they eventually teach, studying the
philosophy of education instead. Id. Few people consider this to be the best way to train
effective teachers. Nearly half of São Paulo’s teachers fail to meet the minimum standards
required to receive a permanent contract. Id. “Bolsa Família” is actually the umbrella term
Lula created in 2003 when he expanded and combined the Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentação,
and other social programs created by Cardoso in 1999 following the Real Crisis. After
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program from 6.5 million families to 11 million in less than two years. Marcelo Neri,
Income Policies, Income Distribution, and Distribution of Opportunities, in BRAZIL AS AN
ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER? 221, 242 (Lael Brainard & Leonardo Martinez-Diaz eds., 2009).
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Brazilian workers by introducing the new “Science Without Borders”
scholarship program, which will send 100,000 Brazilians to top universities
abroad by 2015 to study subjects the government believes are important for
economic growth, mainly hard sciences and engineering.244
A poor education system is related to Brazil’s land distribution
problem. The issue is most evident in Brazil’s largest cities where squatters
have illegally taken up residence on any open space they can find.245 These
illegal settlements have grown into entire neighborhoods, called “favelas,”
where hundreds of thousands of people live with almost no government
services, including schools.246 The residents of these neighborhoods
(usually minorities) lack title to their land and, therefore, lack what many
people consider their most valuable asset.247 The residents also face gross
discrimination from employers, banks, and oftentimes the police just
because of their address.248 The favelas are often overrun by drug gangs
and usually lack basic services like running water and electricity.249
Though the government has made progress in recent years against the
gangs,250 the problems facing the favelas will not be solved any time soon,
which will continue to effectively exclude favela residents from
participating in the formal economy.
One of Brazil’s most important policy goals has been to increase
participation in economic activities by reducing poverty. It has done so
through the well-known “Bolsa Família” program.251 President Cardoso
designed the program—with technical and financial support from the World
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Bank—as a way to reduce current poverty and break the cycle of poverty.252
Through the program, poor families receive money each month (about $35)
on the condition that they keep their children in school and take them for
regular health checkups, with the hope being that those children will grow
up to be healthy, educated workers capable of supporting themselves and
their families without government assistance.253 Eleven million families
(approximately forty-six million people) benefit from the program.254
The program has generated wealth at a grassroots level, with ninetyfour percent of the funds going to the poorest forty-percent of Brazilian
society—most of whom had never benefited from social programs
before.255 It allows recipient families to consume more (studies show that
most of the money is spent on food, school supplies, and clothes for
children), which has created a trickle up effect in which Brazilians sellers
benefit from having more customers, and producers benefit from selling
larger quantities of their products.256 The program has given a large boost
to rural economies and has increased the federal and state tax bases. 257
From 2001 to 2008, the inequality gap shrank by six percent—the largest
improvement in Latin America—and millions of people have been lifted
out of poverty, indicating that the program is working.258
VI. CONCLUSION
As illustrated above, Brazil’s economic evolution has brought the
country to a point where observers regard it as an important emerging
economy gaining voice in global political and economic affairs. The
critical question is how Brazil will exercise its voice. As illustrated by the
Lula quotation at the outset of this Article, calls arose for a New
International Economic Order (NIEO) in the aftermath of the 2008 global
financial crisis.
An NIEO is not a new concept. It first arose in the 1970s and quickly
became a highly controversial—and eventually unsuccessful—effort to
effectuate the principle of sovereign equality of states by reforming
international economic law and policy.259
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In December 2009, the UN passed a resolution entitled, “Towards a
New International Economic Order.”260 The essence of the resolution was
to reaffirm the principles set forth in the NIEO resolutions of the 1970s.
The vote was 108 in favor to none against with fifty-two abstentions.261
Those countries voting in favor were developing countries throughout the
world, including EMEs such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The
developed countries abstained, including the United States. In explanation
of its vote, the United States noted that while it supported “the goal of
moving toward a world in which all nations enjoy the benefits of broad,
inclusive, and sustainable economic growth,” the resolution failed to offer
International Economic Order.” See G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201 (May 1,
1974) (adopting the “Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order”); G.A. Res. 3202 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/5-6/3202 (May 1, 1974) (adopting the
“Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order”).
In December 1974, the General Assembly adopted a re-articulation of the Declaration
and Programme in a resolution titled, “Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.”
See G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974). In 1975, the U.N.
restated these ideals in another resolution after recognizing the movement had lost
momentum. See Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial Development and Cooperation, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1953(LIX)ID/B/155/Add.1 (July 25, 1975).
Among other things, the Global North claimed that the NIEO ideology was hypocritical
considering the domestic politics of many developing countries. The NIEO saw its mission
as just, imperative, and humane, while many NIEO countries were simultaneously violating
human rights and economically oppressing their citizens. Charles Ries, The NIEO: The
Skeptics’ Views, in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: CONFRONTATION OR
COOPERATION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH? 63, 66 (Karl P. Sauvant & Hajo Hasenpflug
eds., 1977). Many of these countries were not democracies, yet they insisted that
intergovernmental institutions become more democratic, specifically the IMF and World
Bank whose voting systems the NIEO thought purposely biased against it. Peter B. Kenen,
Debt Relief as Development Assistance, in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE
NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE 50, 52–54 (Jagdish Bhagwati ed., 1977). Ultimately, there was
considerable dispute over the legal significance of the NIEO. In response to the Global
South’s claims that the NIEO reflected customary international law, critics argued the
nonbinding resolutions were merely moral or political statements, at best constituting “soft
law.” See Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias
Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 461 (2000) (“[T]he NIEO
documents . . . were denied the status of customary law . . . . [T]hus the Charter was declared
to be a ‘political rather than a legal declaration . . . .’”) (citations omitted). Ultimately, the
deep divisions between the North and South left much of the NIEO’s business unfinished. It
met a quiet death (or lapsed into a coma) after the late 1970s. See Michael P. Ryan et al.,
International Governmental Organization Knowledge Management for Multilateral Trade
Lawmaking, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1347, 1372 (2000) (“The GATT’s attempts to solve the
economic problems of developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s [through the NIEO]
were largely feeble.”).
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“fresh thoughts” and “innovative thinking.”262 The United States and other
countries that abstained for these same reasons are right. Trying to
resurrect the NIEO of the 1970s is based on a failed paradigm.
President Lula may well be right that a moral imperative calls for a
new economic order. Given it’s economic, social, and political evolution,
Brazil is in a good position as an EME to draw attention to the need to
begin a global dialogue aimed at articulating a framework for a new order.
To sustain its voice, however, Brazil must continue to address the
challenges identified in this Article.
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